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TRANSFORMING THE “THURMOND RULE” IN 2016 
Carl Tobias∗ 
Senators vigorously dispute the Thurmond Rule’s (Rule) meaning in the 
2016 presidential election year. Developed by Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), the 
Rule is a peculiar tradition—not a statute or even a powerful dictate, like Senate 
rules, which bind members. The party not controlling the White House 
systematically invokes the custom during presidential election years to halt 
judicial designees’ consideration until November with the hope that its standard 
bearer prevails and, thus, can appoint jurists. 
This evaluation suggests that the Rule invites partisan manipulation, shifting 
with the political winds to suit both parties’ distinct needs. For example, in 2004, 
when then-Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) 
deployed it against George W. Bush’s nominees, then-Chair Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah) and current-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) strenuously 
asserted that no Thurmond Rule existed. In 2008, current-Chair Chuck Grassley 
(R-Iowa) similarly deemed the Rule “plain bunk.” This year, he and McConnell 
characterized the tenet as “flexible,” while Grassley declared that nominee 
confirmations generally end at the summer recess. Because confusion plagues 
definition of the stricture, and the Rule’s incessant use dramatically exacerbates 
the vacancy crisis, its perpetuation merits scrutiny. 
This piece first analyzes the Rule’s history. Part II explains the convention 
and its deleterious consequences. Finding that each party reinterprets the notion 
to stymie appointments—which perverts the selection process, deprives courts 
of judicial resources for delivering justice, and intensifies the “confirmation 
wars”—the final Part proffers solutions. Because the Rule has multiple 
detrimental effects, it warrants abolition. 
 
 ∗ Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond. I wish to thank Margaret Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Katie Lehnen for valuable research, Leslee Stone for excellent processing, the Emory Law Journal 
editors for careful editing, as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Williams Summer Endowment Research 
Fund for generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are mine alone. 
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I. THE RULE’S ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Rule’s creation and growth deserve little examination here.1 Thurmond 
crafted the precept in 1980, asking Ronald Reagan to urge that GOP senators 
delay Jimmy Carter’s aspirants.2 The measure has received checkered 
application ever since. For instance, evidence indicates that neither party 
capitalized on the doctrine very much ahead of Judge Robert Bork’s 1987 
disputed Supreme Court appointment.3 The following year, Reagan’s last, the 
Democratic majority prompted rapid confirmation for Justice Anthony Kennedy 
as well as seven circuit and thirty-four district nominees.4 A prominent rejection 
of the concept, even at the tool’s inception, was the suggestion by Edward 
Kennedy (D-Ma.), who deftly instigated Thurmond’s promotion of appellate 
confirmation for Stephen Breyer after Reagan had defeated Carter.5 
A related view espoused by Republican leaders for denying able, consensus 
prospects floor votes is that the Senate has treated President Barack Obama very 
fairly by approving twenty-three more nominees than Democrats approved at 
the equivalent juncture of Bush’s final year.6 This contention appears misleading 
 
 1 Others have assessed the creation and growth of the Thurmond Rule. E.g., Russell Wheeler, The 
“Thurmond Rule” and Other Advice and Consent Myths, BROOKINGS INST. (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/2016/05/25/the-thurmond-rule-and-other-advice-and-consent-myths/; BARRY J. 
MCMILLION, FINAL SENATE ACTION ON U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS DURING A 
PRESIDENT’S EIGHTH YEAR IN OFFICE (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44353.pdf. 
 2 DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & KEVIN M. SCOTT, NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION OF LOWER FEDERAL 
COURT JUDGES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS 7, 15–16 (2008); see BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE 
RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 512-22 (1988) (opposing the nominee by filibustering partly 
because 1968 was a presidential election year). 
 3 ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 322–27 (1st ed. 
1989) (discussing the strategies used to oppose Judge Bork’s appointment, which did not include the Thurmond 
Rule); MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF 
ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 68–75 (1992) (discussing Democrat and Republican 
strategies in the Bork appointment without mentioning the Thurmond Rule); Wheeler, supra note 1 (noting the 
“ten post-August circuit confirmations in 1984, 1988, and 1992, during and immediately following Thurmond’s 
chairmanship”). 
 4 DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONFIRMATION OF THE U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT 
COURT NOMINATIONS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS 6 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R42600.pdf. Even in 1992, which was George H. W. Bush’s last year, the Democratic Senate majority helped 
approve eleven circuit and fifty-five district jurists. Id. 
 5 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT 
THROUGH REAGAN 261 (1999); RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra note 2, at 16–17.  
 6 162 CONG. REC. S3,614 (daily ed. June 8, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell); see 160 CONG. REC. 
S2,635 (daily ed. May 5, 2014) (statement of Sen. Grassley); Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, New Wars of 
Advice and Consent: Judicial Selection in the Obama Years, 97 JUDICATURE 48, 50-51 (2013); Amanda Terkel, 
Mitch McConnell: Senate GOP Has Treated Obama’s Judicial Nominees ‘Very Fairly’, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/obamas-judicial-nominees_n_3046778.html; 
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because it fails to consider the larger appointments context. The germane 
questions are (1) whether the upper chamber has equitably addressed federal 
court, litigant, and counsel needs manifested in the substantial vacancies, 
particularly judicial emergencies, over specified times, and (2) whether the 
President has nominated and the Senate has confirmed a sufficient number of 
accomplished, consensus nominees to satisfy those needs.7 
Indeed, Democratic majorities have treated Republican Presidents better 
than Republican majorities have addressed Democratic chief executives since 
1988. In Reagan’s last year, the Democratic majority rather promptly approved 
Justice Kennedy and seven appellate court nominees.8 In 1992, this majority 
confirmed eleven Bush père appellate court jurists.9 During 2004, the chamber 
appointed five Bush circuit and thirty-two trial judges, while in 2008, senators 
robustly confirmed four appellate court and twenty-four district court 
nominees.10 
The approval record compares favorably with appointments made over 
Democratic chief executives’ terms. In 1996, the Republican majority approved 
 
RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra note 2, at 1 (stating similar views from President Bush and the Senate in 2008); Russell 
Wheeler, Is a 112 Percent Increase in Judicial Vacancies Par for the Course?, BROOKINGS INST. (June 6, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/2016/06/06/is-a-112-percent-increase-in-judicial-vacancies-par-for-the-course/. 
 7 The courts have eighty-eight openings and thirty-five emergencies; twenty-two of fifty-one nominees 
had hearings and votes; and Republican delays left nearly ninety vacancies for most of five years after September 
2009. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies (last visited Aug. 31, 2016) (archiving judicial vacancy data starting in 
1981); Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate and Regular Order, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 12, 15 n.17, 33–34 
(2016) (noting that home-state senators’ support and overwhelming committee and floor votes demonstrate that 
nominees are able and uncontroversial).  
 8 See RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 6 tbl.1; Press Release, Josh Earnest, Press Secretary of the 
White House, Press Briefing (March 18, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/press-
briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-3182016. In October 1988, two circuit judges won approval. 134 CONG. 
REC. S16,382 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (announcing the confirmation of Judges John M Duhe, Jr., and Richard 
L. Nygaard).  
 9 RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 6 tbl.1 After June 1992, six circuit jurists won approval. 138 
CONG. REC. 22,991 (1992) (announcing the confirmation of Judge Susan H. Black); 138 CONG. REC. S12,771 
(daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (announcing the confirmation of Judges Alvin A. Schall and Ilana Diamond Rovner); 
138 CONG. REC. 24,279 (1992) (announcing the confirmation of Judge Edward E. Carnes); id. at 28,779 (1992) 
(announcing the confirmation of Judge Dennis G. Jacobs); id. at 34,240 (1992) (announcing the confirmation of 
Judge Timothy K. Lewis). 
 10 RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 6 tbl.1. After April 2004, five circuit and twenty-seven district 
judges won approval. Judicial Nominations: 108th Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVE, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/judicialnominations108.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 2004 could be an 
exception, but the Republicans had a majority and fewer vacancies. After May 2008, four circuit and twenty 
district jurists won approval. Judicial Nominations: 110th Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVE, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/nominations.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
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two Bill Clinton appellate court nominees.11 In 2000, it promoted appointment 
of eight circuit judges.12 In 2012, the Senate confirmed five Obama appeals court 
and forty-five trial court nominees.13 This year, the Republican majority has 
approved one circuit nominee and eight district nominees.14 Those records and 
the individuals confirmed show that Democrats, more than Republicans, directly 
apply the Rule only to controversial picks, so they find that accomplished, 
consensus nominees deserve appointment over the whole presidential election 
year.15 
In short, the 2016 results powerfully contrast with Democrats’ record 
approving four circuit and two dozen trial nominees at the comparable moment 
of Bush’s administration.16 The numbers portend badly this year, and the 
Republicans must sharply escalate confirmations now to match actions in 2007–
08. Both parties should also persistently collaborate, especially by invalidating 
the Rule. 
II. PROBLEMATIC SELECTION AND THE THURMOND RULE 
The explanations for selection difficulties and the Rule’s insistent 
deployment are complex.17 Although perceptive observers attribute the 
 
 11 RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 6 tbl.1. In January 1996, both circuit judges won approval. 141 
CONG. REC. S19,325 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1996) (announcing the confirmation of Judges A. Wallace Tashima and 
Sidney R. Thomas).  
 12 RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 6 tbl.1. After June 2000, one circuit judge won approval. 146 
CONG. REC. S7457 (daily ed. July 21, 2000) (announcing the confirmation of Judge Johnnie B. Rawlinson). 
 13 Judicial Nominations: 112th Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVE, https://www.justice.gov/ 
archive/olp/judicialnominations112.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). After June 12, 2012, no circuit and twenty-
two district judges won approval. Democrats had a majority in 2012. Id. 
 14 Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 7. In 2007–08, sixty-eight judges won approval, 162 CONG. 
REC. S4,797 (daily ed. July 6, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy), while in 2015–16, only twenty judges have won 
approval, 162 CONG. REC. S4,795 (daily ed. July 6, 2016) (statement of Sen. Booker). 
 15 Compare 158 CONG. REC. S5,245 (July 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy), with Statement of Senator 
Chuck Grassley, Executive Business Meeting, Senate Judiciary Committee (May 19, 2016). “Consensus” is a 
malleable concept, and the notion can even be manipulated. 
 16 Editorial, The Senate’s Confirmation Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1TX5HrV; 
supra notes 11, 14. 
 17 Scholars and senators have long debated whether selection has always been controversial and politicized. 
Michael J. Gerhardt & Michael Ashley Stein, The Politics of Early Justice: Federal Judicial Selection, 1789–
1861, 100 IOWA L. REV. 551, 553 (2015); Orrin G. Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial 
Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1038–39 (2009). Other longtime observers have debated the 
Thurmond Rule’s meaning and efficacy. Compare Wheeler, supra note 1 (comparing the application of the Rule 
between the Bush and Obama Administrations), with Ed Whelan, The Fictitious “Thurmond Rule”, NAT’L REV. 
(Mar. 5, 2008, 4:06 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51124/fictitious-thurmond-rule-ed-
whelan (“But it is highly dubious that Senator Thurmond ever proclaimed such a rule, and he certainly never 
implemented it.”).  
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confirmation wars and the custom’s enhanced use to the Bork fight, the wars and 
the convention’s increased deployment are interrelated because the Rule 
currently serves as a potent weapon that combatants employ in quadrennial 
skirmishes, which punctuate these wars.18 The observers ascertain that selection 
has collapsed, as witnessed in corrosive partisanship, systemic paybacks, and 
strident divisiveness whereby the parties ratchet down review.19 
The consequences are grim. The very limited confirmation activity since 
2015 means the bench possesses twelve circuit, seventy-six district, and thirty-
five emergency vacancies.20 The “few” unfilled judicial posts resulted from the 
Democrats’ 2013 release of the nuclear option; this curbed filibusters, which the 
Republicans had invoked when delaying three exceptional, moderate nominees’ 
appointments for the D.C. Circuit, the second most important tribunal.21 But 
negligible confirmations across Obama’s last two years will spark many 2017 
court openings and emergencies.22 In fact, the Rule works perniciously by 
allowing vacancies to soar near the presidency’s conclusion, which makes the 
new administration confront manifold empty seats precisely when it addresses 
the daunting startup challenges of promptly establishing a government.23 
 
 18 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 19 The Rule exacerbates these complications. Most recent were claims that Democrats stalled Bush’s last 
two years and that Republicans created unprecedented delay over much of Obama’s first five years. Democrats 
then detonated the “nuclear option,” which allowed the Senate to confirm many judges in 2014’s lame duck 
session. The Republicans next drastically slowed appointments. Tobias, supra note 7, at 19–22; Seung Min Kim, 
McConnell’s Historic Judge Blockade, POLITICO (July 14, 2016, 5:16 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2016/07/mitch-mcconnell-judges-225455.  
 20 Judicial Vacancy Summary for September 2016, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2016/09/summary (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); Judicial 
Emergencies for September 2016, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2016/09/summary (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). The emergency vacancies 
rose from twelve in January 2015 to as many as thirty-four. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 7. 
 21 Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L.J. 121, 121–22 (2015); Jeffrey Toobin, The 
Obama Brief, NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24; see Tobias, supra note 7, at 33 (noting that the nuclear option 
facilitated many confirmations across 2013–14). 
 22 Future Judicial Vacancies for September 2016, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2016/09/future (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); Russell 
Wheeler, Recess is Over: Time To Confirm Judges, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/09/06/recess-is-over-time-to-confirm-judges/; supra note 14; see 
Paul Bedard, Federal Judge Retirements Surge, Next President to Remake Courts, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 12, 
2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/federal-judge-retirements-surge-next-president-to-remake-
courts/article/ 
2601526. 
 23 The Thurmond Rule partly explains vacancies’ rapid rise in 2009 and will partly explain a likely 2017 
rise. See Sheldon Goldman, Sarah Schiavoni & Elliot Slotnick, W. Bush’s Judicial Legacy: Mission 
Accomplished, 92 JUDICATURE 258, 263-64, 267 (2009); Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from 
Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 232 
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Slow approvals, compounded by the Rule’s application, have numerous 
critical adverse impacts.24 The stalled approvals cause nominees to leave careers 
on hold and dissuade myriad remarkable prospects from contemplating the 
bench.25 Stymied appointments deprive courts of judicial resources and 
countless parties of justice.26 Those damaging effects also undermine citizen 
regard for the selection procedures and the government.27 
In sum, this canvass demonstrates the profound need for expeditious Senate 
assessment of nominees, which the Thurmond Rule’s concerted deployment 
assiduously curtails. Accordingly, the chamber must institute salutary remedies 
that encourage increased yes or no votes, particularly through the mechanism’s 
swift abrogation. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Short-Term Suggestions 
During the 2016 presidential election year, the Senate needs to cabin the Rule 
by following distinctly relevant precedent from 2007–08 when the Democratic 
majority helped approve ten Bush circuit and fifty-eight trial nominees. With 
minimal time left before December, securing these figures now could prove 
unrealistic, as the Republicans have slowly processed individuals ever since 
 
(2012); RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 18. But cf. RUTKUS & MCMILLION, supra note 4, at 17 (stating 
that court vacancy rates have increased and decreased in the previous eight election years); Joe Palazzolo, 
Obama’s Successor Will Likely Fill Dozens of Judicial Vacancies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2016, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-successor-will-likely-fill-dozens-of-judicial-vacancies-1458340351 
(predicting the large number of judicial vacancies that will need to be filled in 2017). 
 24 Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2233, 2253 
(2013).  
 25 Tobias, supra note 24, at 2253; Todd Ruger, Nominees Are Living on Hold; Caught in a Political Game, 
Judicial Candidates Get Used to Waiting, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202581557603/Nominees-are-living-on-hold.  
 26 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–8 (2010); Jennifer 
Bendery, Federal Judges Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721 
e4b0a40aa3aaf14b; Andrew Cohen, In Pennsylvania, the Human Costs of Judicial Confirmation, THE ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/political/archive/2012/09/in-pennsylnania-the-human-costs-of-
judicial-confirmation-delays/261862/; Tobias, supra note 24, at 2253. 
 27 Tobias, supra note 24, at 2253; Spencer S. Hsu, Waiting for Next President, Confirmations of Federal 
Trial Judges Stall, WASH. POST (June 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/waiting-
for-next-president-confirmations-of-federal-trial-judges-stall/2016/06/05/9b626aa4-222f-11e6-9e7f-57890b61 
2299_story.html; Shira A. Scheindlin, Opinion, America’s Trial Court Judges: Our Front Line for Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/opinion/americas-trial-court-judges-our-front-line-
for-justice.html.  
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2015, confirming merely twenty recommendations. The party must equal the 
numbers from 2008 when Democrats rapidly appointed four Bush circuit and 
twenty-four district court submissions.28 Attaining this many confirmations 
would necessitate chamber votes on three appellate candidates29 and final ballots 
on sixteen of the trial level designees with reports.30 That initiative could protect 
the status quo, preserve expectations—if warranted—and deter gaming of the 
system until the parties subscribe to permanent reform. 
B. Long-Term Suggestions 
1. Abolishing the Thurmond Rule 
Most crucially, the Senate needs to devise a long-term approach, preferably 
by eliminating the Rule, a solution on which the parties must concur this year 
but would only start applying in the next presidential election season to limit 
unfair benefit for either party. When abolishing the counterproductive Rule, both 
parties should cooperate to fill the maximum vacancies by appointing dynamic, 
centrist nominees throughout presidential election years. Senators, therefore, 
would implement the protocol that governed before the Rule’s effectuation.31 
The suggestion merits adoption because it duly honors constitutional 
phrasing and respects voters’ choices for President and Senate by permitting the 
chief executive to nominate and senators to carefully advise and consent about 
court members across the full terms of the President and senators.32 This idea 
correspondingly addresses the needs of federal court judges, parties, and counsel 
for speedy, economical, and fair dispute resolution through decreasing 
vacancies.33 Moreover, Thurmond’s proviso is not a law or even a Senate 
 
 28 See supra text accompanying note 10. This is a floor, not a ceiling.  
 29 Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit nominees Donald Schott, Jennifer Klemetsrud Puhl, and Lucy Haeran 
Koh received committee hearings and panel votes. On Judicial Nominations Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 
114th Cong. (July 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); On Judicial Nominations Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 
114th Cong. 1 (June 21, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); On Judicial Nominations Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm., 114th Cong. 1 (May 18, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley, 
Executive Business Meeting, Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 15, 2016); Statement of Senator Chuck 
Grassley, Executive Business Meeting, Senate Judiciary Committee (July 14, 2016); Statement of Senator Chuck 
Grassley, Executive Business Meeting, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 16, 2016). 
 30 If seventeen of the nineteen nominees awaiting floor votes win approval, that would equal Bush’s 2008 
appointments. Archives of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 7. 
 31 See Kim, supra note 19. 
 32 The appointments and recess appointments clauses envision nomination and advice and consent 
throughout presidential and senatorial terms. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2–3. 
 33 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1328–29 (1995). 
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requirement, much less demanded by the Constitution. In fact, the Rule acutely 
contravenes the Constitution because it undercuts the document’s explicit 
nomination and confirmation prescriptions.34 The Rule in turn allows conflicting 
enforcement and confusion, and it is pervaded with exceptions. Indeed, the Rule 
serves principally to exacerbate the confirmation wars’ most deleterious 
facets—striking partisanship and systemic paybacks—in successive presidential 
election years.35 
Nonetheless, a Senate majority will probably oppose this initiative. A few 
senators would consider Rule abrogation a unilateral disarmament, not realistic 
or draconian, while others may lack the political courage to eliminate the Rule. 
Some will perceive that several purposes, which ostensibly supported its early 
articulation, have continued pertinence. For instance, when elections are 
imminent, chamber ballots may halt due to stated respect for the preferences that 
citizens would soon express through the election and concomitantly for the 
elected President and senators impending nomination and confirmation 
prerogatives.36 The senators’ propositions above must yield to (1) the specific 
constitutional directives, which authorize nomination coupled with advice and 
consent across the officials’ whole tenure, (2) millions of voters’ will evidenced 
in electing the current President and Senate, and (3) federal court, litigant, and 
practitioner needs for rapid, inexpensive, and equitable case disposition.37 
2. Modifying the Thurmond Rule 
Insofar as senators’ concerns apply, federal politicians might satisfy them by 
codifying the provision as a formal chamber stipulation through relevant 
parameters that Democrats and Republicans do not “redefine” over succeeding 
presidential election years. This would clearly define the Rule and illuminate 
exactly how the proviso works. One critical example is the exclusion of able, 
consensus aspirants, an idea which leading senators from each party have 
 
 34 Editorial, Reject the Thurmond Rule, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/ 
jul/12/opinion/la-ed-mcconnell-judicial-nominees-20120712.  
 35 See supra text accompanying note 19. Few policy or practical ideas support perpetuation of the 
Thurmond Rule. 
 36 They resemble Republican reasons for not considering Merrick Garland, Obama’s Supreme Court 
nominee. Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, McConnell and Grassley: Democrats Shouldn’t Rob Voters of 
Chance to Replace Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mcconnell-
and-grassley-democrats-shouldnt-rob-voters-of-chance-to-replace-scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be 
55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html?utm_term=.3aadfbfce503. 
 37 162 CONG. REC. S2,684–85 (daily ed. May 11, 2016) (statement of Sen. Durbin); see supra text 
accompanying notes 32–33. 
TOBIAS GALLEYSFINAL 9/26/2016 9:19 AM 
2016] TRANSFORMING THE “THURMOND RULE” 2009 
strongly championed or acknowledged. This clear definition honors the 
Constitution and invokes tradition before and even following the Rule’s initial 
use, most notably over the concluding Bush years.38 
The chamber must prescribe the deadline by which appellate nominees 
would receive floor ballots. Grassley stated that the last presidential year’s first 
half was the contemporary benchmark.39 But it seems advisable to permit 
September, or maybe the lame duck session, to be the deadline for final 
consideration on all nominees whom a chamber majority prefers to have Senate 
votes. September confirmations have occurred in recent Republican 
presidencies,40 and the nuclear option dictated majority ballots for cloture.41 
Three arguments can substantiate relatively disparate treatment of appeals court 
prospects. First, administrations emphasize ideology when forwarding these 
recommendations.42 Second, numerous circuit opinions enunciate policy and 
govern multiple, contiguous states.43 Third, twenty-first century practice has 
been to approve no candidate during the second half of the President’s last 
year.44 
The final group of propositions demonstrate why applying the Rule to district 
nominations would be unnecessary. Observers state that Presidents emphasize 
these nominees’ competence rather than ideology,45 which means that nominees 
are comparatively mainstream. Trial level determinations also set less policy and 
cover smaller geographic regions.46 Accordingly, the practice has been to 
confirm the jurists subsequent to Labor Day and even in post-election 
November.47 
 
 38 See supra notes 15, 32, 37 and accompanying text; infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 39 Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley, Executive Business Meeting, Senate Judiciary Committee (May 
19, 2016); see supra notes 11–14. 
 40 See supra notes 4, 8–9; see also supra note 5. But see supra note 10. 
 41 See supra note 21. Lame duck votes would allow gaming the system, as the Republicans have with 
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CONCLUSION 
Chronic partisanship attends the Thurmond Rule’s deployment, significantly 
propelling the splenetic confirmation wars across modern presidential election 
years. The chamber needs to abolish the Rule, or at least codify and confine the 
approach within the Senate rules until a clear majority who favors abrogation 
emerges. 
 
